Abstract To understand network behavior, researchers and enterprise network operators must interpret large amounts of network data. To understand and manage network events such as outages, route instability, and spam campaigns, they must interpret data that covers a range of networks and evolves over time. We propose a simple clustering algorithm that helps identify spatial clusters of network events based on correlations in event timing, producing 2-D visualizations. We show that these visualizations where they reveal the extent, timing, and dynamics of network outages such as January 2011 Egyptian change of government, and the March 2011 Japanese earthquake. We also show they reveal correlations in routing changes that are hidden from AS-path analysis.
congestion occurs and subsides, routes change [12, 13] , spam campaigns and denialof-service attacks wax and wane [7, 15] . In many cases, these events have common root causes: a shared router that fails [25] , or a common change to software or a configuration [17] , or distributed botnet with common external control.
One can infer common root causes of network events by studying their occurrence over space and time. By space, we mean the Internet topology or address space, since root causes are often associated with particular routers, Autonomous Systems (ASes), or address blocks. By time, we mean events can be reduced to discrete times or ranges, like network outages or bursts of spam messages. Events that are continuous (such as degree of congestion) are not our primary focus, but could be studied by looking for threshold changes.
Our goal is to detect repeated correlations in time and space. We assume that events that are repeated in time suggest a common root cause. We wish to know how widely correlated they are in space to understand the potential extent of that cause. While correlation does not guarantee a cause, and the step from correlation to causation is necessarily specific to each event, repeated correlation can help network operators narrow the search space of problems. We intentionally make few assumptions about network topology, considering each observation independently and not considering topological hints offered by AS paths or address structure. We choose this "handsoff" approach since it can reveal hidden correlations-cases where networks with different addresses and AS paths share potentially related failure causes.
We propose a clustering algorithm that groups events that happen at similar times in network address space, supporting a two-dimensional visualization that reveals patterns (Sect. 2). The contribution of this paper is to show that simple clustering is helpful at determining correlated network events. We support this claim with examples of such events for network outages (Sect. 3) and for routing changes (Sect. 4). We find that clustering reveals the size and dynamics of network outages, and our approach to clustering routing changes provides evidence of correlations suggesting possible shared root causes that are not visible in AS-path-data alone.
Data from this paper is available at no cost from the authors, as described on-line [23] .
Visualizing correlated events
We begin by describing how we identify clusters in a timeseries Ω b (i) for an array of blocks b and discrete times (or rounds) i. Each element of Ω b (i) takes a binary value indicating the presence or absence of an event. We later apply this method to two datasets: network outages (Sect. 3), where blocks are /24 address prefixes with 11-min rounds; and network route changes (Sect. 4), where blocks are variable-size address prefixes from BGP with 2-h rounds.
Clustering visualization of network data
Our simple clustering algorithm groups the network event timeseries (Ω(·)) in two dimensions: time and space (Algorithm 1). We order blocks based on Hamming dis-tance. For blocks m and n, with binary-valued timeseries Ω m (i) and Ω n (i), we define distance:
Perfect temporal correlation occurs if
d h (m, n) = 0.
Algorithm 1 Clustering of blocks for visualization
Input: A: the set of blocks, with Ω(·) event timeseries Output: B: reordered list of blocks, by distance start with block m ∈ A with smallest Ω m (i) (number of events)
Since network events often require some time to propagate [12] , we consider blocks with small variance of event times (less than a parameter θ ) to be close. This approach may fail if there are two unrelated events with similar timing, but we believe that timing alone is often sufficient to correlate to larger events in today's Internet, provided we use a conservative θ . Table 1 lists the survey datasets we use in this paper. Figure 1 shows the result of visualization clustering for network outages in Survey S 38c . This dataset uses a study of routing outages in about 10,600 blocks as described later in Sect. 3.1. The x-axis is time, each row shows the Ω b downtime for a different /24 block b. Due to space constraints, we plot only the 500 blocks with most outages; we provide the full graph as Supplement 1 [23] . Color is keyed to the country to whom each block is allocated. Performance and alternatives Our clustering algorithm is a simple greedy algorithm; its performance is O(b 2 ) for b blocks. Although we would prefer a faster algorithm, the largest possible b for IPv4 is 2 24 ; a value within the reach of current computers. We have done clustering for 2.5 M blocks, processing time is about 35 min on a single core of a 2.2GHz Intel Xeon CPU.
We considered other standard clustering algorithms, including k-means and hierarchical agglomerative clustering, but found neither suitable for our problem. The k-means algorithm cannot be used because we do not know how many k clusters exist beforehand. Hierarchical agglomerative clustering has runtime O(b 3 ), pushing its performance out of reach for our larger datasets.
Choice of the closeness threshold
Our clustering algorithm depends on θ , the threshold determining when blocks are close enough to cluster. We want to use a conservative θ , to be safe when declaring two blocks are close in temporal behavior. We use θ = 2 rounds (22 min for outages, 4 h for route changes), in clustering events. We have also studied much larger θ = 10 (110 min for outages), finding the main difference is it tends to group more single-round events together [22] (omitted due to space).
Marginal distributions
In addition to basic clustering, we find the marginal distributions are important to characterize the size of an event relative to the whole network. To evaluate events over the Internet as a whole, we next define statistical measures, how many and for how long blocks are experiencing events. Figure 2 , with data from S 30w , shows an example of marginal distributions (full figure as Supplement 5 in [23] ). We see outages that affect many blocks for a short period (event (c) here, about 20 min), while others like (d) and (e) affect fewer blocks but for longer periods of time (here 2-3 h).
Given N b blocks and N i times in an observation, the marginal distributions are the time-and space-specific sums: The above metrics are useful to characterize the degree of network events in today's Internet. We consider long-term trends and validation of these metrics as part of outage computation [22] .
Handling large images
The IPv4 address space covers thousands of blocks, and events can span large parts of that space. Even at one pixel per block and round, visualizations are large: of 20 k×1 k for 2-week outage survey; 2.5 M × 130 for a 24-h, whole Internet outage study (Supplement 6 in [23] ); and 130k × 360 for a 1-month routing change study. These large images quickly become difficult to view in traditional tools, where viewers typically assume the image fits in memory, and more robust tools (like Photoshop) are encumbered with editing. We have therefore implemented a custom, Google-mapsstyle web-based browser to make them more accessible. We use OpenLayers and the "slippy map" from Open Street Map [21] . Interactive examples of our visualizations are on the web in our supplemental data [23] .
Visualizing network outages
Our first application is to visualize network outages. We use existing outage information derived from active probing [22] ; we describe this source briefly below. Visualization is useful to characterize both large and small outages, and evaluate outage onset and recovery.
Data sources: detecting outages
We visualize outage data covering from 10k to 2.5M /24 blocks from two data sources.
Outage detection through probing We draw on probing data from two sources. First, we consider Internet address surveys: active probing of all addresses in a sample of about 22k /24 address blocks in the IPv4 address space for two weeks [9] . Second, we probe 20 addresses in each /24 block for the entire measurable IPv4 address space (blocks with addresses that will respond), 2.5M blocks, for 24 h [22] .
In both cases, addresses are probed in a pseudo-random order, spreading probes out over an 11 min round. We are careful to consider clock drift when mapping probes to rounds. We observe similar results from data taken from locations in California, Colorado, and Japan.
Detecting block-level outages The overall responsiveness of block b at round i is defined as the fraction of responding addresses. We watch the change of the overall responsiveness at round i against recent behavior, and conclude an outage starts if we see a threshold-determined, dramatic drop in responsiveness (likewise for outage ends, with a dramatic increase of responsiveness). The output of this step is the binary timeseries Ω b (i).
Details of data collection and validation of the method are outside the scope of this paper on visualization, but are available elsewhere [22] . In principle, our visualization methods can be applied to other sources of outage input, such as that from iPlane [16] , Hubble [11] , or localized methods [24] ; such integration is future work.
Learning from outage visualization
Visualization has been important in developing our outage detection methods. We use visualization to quickly identify both large and typical events and to gain intuition about the dynamics of outages. Visualization is also important to diagnose problems in data collection and analysis. We describe each of these cases below.
Identifying large events from background The most important benefit of visualization is to provide an intuitive view of a large amount of data: quickly scanning a two-week survey allows one to "eye-ball" about 20 M data points, yet large events and trends jump out from noisy background data.
As one example, the region marked (a) in Fig. 1 corresponds to the Egyptian Internet outage in response to protests that resulted in the resignation of the Mubarak government by 2011-02-11 [20] . This survey began 2011-01-27 T23:07 +0000, just missing the beginning of the Egyptian network shutdown, and observed the restoration of network service around 2011-02-02 T09:28 +0000. Our survey covered 19 responsive /24 blocks in the Egyptian Internet (about 1% of responsive networks in Egypt). The use of country-specific coloring helps this outage stand out in our visualization.
A second interesting example is a significant Australian outage in the same dataset, marked (b) in Fig. 1 . We are able to locate these blocks in the east coast of Australia, including Sydney and Brisbane. Private communications [1] and the AusNOG mailing list [2] suggest this outage may be related to mid-January flooding in eastern Australia. The recovery of the network seems consistent with news reports about telecommunications repairs [10] . Visualization is important in this case to demonstrate that the outage was about as large and long-lasting as the Egyptian outage, yet the Egyptian Internet outage made global news while the Australian outage got little discussion. The Egyptian outage was more newsworthy both because of the political significance, and because it represented nearly all Egyptian traffic. Australia, by comparison, has eight times more allocated IPv4 addresses than Egypt, so though the Australian outage may be as large as the Egyptian one, it does not have the same country-wide impact. Visualization was the primary reason this outage came to our attention, as there was minimal news coverage, and nearly none that emphasized network problems.
Although our visualization methods help large events to stand out, and can provide an overview of small events, ultimately automated tools are necessary to consistently find and characterize events. We believe the large events described here show the usefulness of our visualization, but we refer interested readers to our technical report for discussion of tools to quantify large and small outages, and for analysis of a random sample of events [22] .
Understanding dynamics of outages In addition to presence of outages, visualization is ideal to reveal the dynamics of complicated outages. For example, in Survey S 39c , we see Japanese network outages related to the Tōhoku Japanese earthquake of 2011-03-11 [18] , marked (f) in Fig. 3 . Unlike most other outages we observe, both the start and recovery from this outage vary in time. For many blocks, the outage begins at the exact Fig. 3 The 500 largest outages in Survey S 39c , x axis: time, y axis: address space (blocks). Colors represent countries. Subgraphs on X and Y axis show marginal distributions (green line) and overall block responsiveness (red dots). Full interactive graph available as Supplement 2 in [23] time of the earthquake, but for some it occurs 2 h later. Recovery for most blocks occurs within 10 h, but a few remain down for several days. Analysis by IIJ provides details about Japanese network outages and recoveries from the perspective of a network operator [5] , confirming our observations. The contribution of our visualization method is to provide some information about the impact of this natural disaster on the network, but observable externally by non-experts on Japanese network topology.
Quantifying typical outages In addition to major events, visualization also helps characterize typical network behavior. We can see this partly in the scattering of outages in Fig. 1 . We can also see that outages come in different "shapes", with many small and short, some long duration, like (a) and (b) in this figure, and others are "taller" (affecting more networks), like (g) in Fig. 4 .
We have found ground truth for several regional outages of different shapes. Survey S 30w , omitted here for space but available as Supplement 5 in [23] and as Fig. 3 in [22] , shows three regional network outages: (c) a Verizon outage affecting many (331) /24 blocks for a short time (22 min); (d) an AT&T/Comcast outage affecting fewer (12) blocks for longer time (165 min); and (e), a large Mexico outage affecting 105 blocks. These three events show how visualization quickly characterizes the different shapes of typical events, from tall events like (c) that affect many networks and multiple countries, to fatter, longer outages like (d) and (e). It also shows the value of marginal distributions; both of these significant regional events show up as bumps in Ω I running along the x-axis.
Detecting problems in local networks and data collection Finally, we have found visualization vital to gaining confidence in our measurement approach by revealing problems in our network and software. Figure 4 (from Survey S 39w ) shows examples of three problems we detected with visualization and then corrected.
First, event (g) shows a long-term outage of over 200 networks, all at USC. In diagnosing this problem, we discovered that USC's network operators chose to block our probes, in spite of pre-authorization. Visualization helped us detect and repair this misunderstanding.
Events (h) and (i) both show outages across all monitored blocks (although this visualization shows only 500 of them), corresponding to planned maintenance activities. Event (h) was planned maintenance in our server room; the blue color indicates Fig. 4 The 500 largest outages in S 39w , x axis: time, y axis: address space (blocks). Colors represent countries. Subgraphs on X and Y axis show marginal distributions (green line) and overall block responsiveness (red dots). Full interactive graph available as Supplement 3 in [23] absence of data because we temporarily suspended data collection. Event (i) was a second planned power outage that took down a router near our survey machines, although probes continued running. More subtly, the smattering of white "up" blocks in event (i) shows a data collection problem. The combination of actively probing 20 k blocks, and all probes timing out due to a powered-off second-hop router, results in the overflow of connection tracking (iptables) at our probing machine. Such overflow produces random ICMP network unreachable error replies at the probing host, which are then interpreted incorrectly as a response from the remote network. We have since corrected this problem by disabling ICMP connection tracking, but it was detected only because of differences in visualization.
Visualizing routing changes
We have also used our clustering algorithm to visualize BGP path changes. We find that visualization is helpful in finding correlated BGP path changes, sometimes showing common failure sources that are not obvious from simple inspection of AS paths. Visualization of path changes also shows that our methodology generalizes to other kinds of network timeseries.
Data sources: detecting BGP path changes
We collect BGP snapshots with BGPmon [27] , at three sites in California, Colorado, and Japan, taking snapshots every 2 h. To visualize this data, we consider each announced, routable IPv4 prefix as a block, and the 2-h collection interval as round duration. (Finer time resolution is future work.)
To generate our Ω b (i) timeseries, we compare the AS path at round i with round i − 1 for each prefix (block) b, setting Ω b (i) = 1 if the paths differ. We apply our [23] clustering visualization algorithm to Ω b (i), to find groups of BGP prefixes that show similar timing across repeated route changes.
Learning from visualizing route changes
Just as with network outages (Sect. 3.2), we find that visualization of route changes can be used to quickly identify large events, to understand dynamics, and to quantify these changes with marginal distributions.
Comparing route changes to outages Comparing route changes to outages, visualization makes it clear that route changes affect many more prefixes and more frequent but shorter than network outages. For example, route changes in Fig. 5 affect hundreds of blocks, each of which is often much larger than a /24, while outages (such as Fig. 3 ) typically affect only a few /24 s, but often for much longer. Such comparisons must be made carefully, though, since the time and spatial scales of our visualizations are different. In both cases, though, repeated temporal correlations are useful to suggest blocks that behave similarly.
Finding hidden prefix correlations Prior approaches have studied AS paths to detect common points of failure [4] . Our approach, however, uses only timing to cluster blocks into events, thus it can reveal correlations that are not apparent from AS paths alone. We describe several examples below using data from our Japanese routing vantage point taken in June 2012.
An example of correlated routing problems To illustrate a correlation seen in our data, we observe several correlated route changes affecting 242 routing prefixes on 3 days, as shown in Fig. 5 .
While correlated routing changes are expected, but it is surprising when correlated appear to be caused at different points in the AS path. Frequency of hidden correlations Hidden correlations are not uncommon. We examined all 8,716 clusters in our June 2012 data and found that about 11% showed such hidden prefix correlations. Analyzing the root causes of such correlations is future work, outside the scope of this visualization paper, but we believe it demonstrates that visualization and our simple clustering algorithm can reveal hidden correlations.
Related work
Although there is significant prior work on routing outages and route changes, there has been much less work visualizing network phenomena.
Several prior papers have visualized numbers of outages by time, including Markopolou et al. [19] , Turner et al. [25] , and Gill et al. [8] . While showing timeseries, none of these attempt to cluster the blocks to bring out correlations. Our clustering would make the correlations they discuss more obvious.
Data clustering is a well established field and there are many generic clustering algorithms (refer to [14, 26] for detailed surveys), we employ a simple greedy algorithm most suitable for our problem (Sect. 2.1).
Somewhat related to our visualization work is CAIDA's AS dispersion graphs, which cluster and visualize based on the common AS paths from one point to many destinations [3] . This intuitive visualization shows the AS level connectivity seen at a vantage point. We complement their work by clustering the changes of AS paths, instead of static analysis.
For a review of related work beyond visualization, we refer readers to our evaluation of outage detection [22] .
Conclusions
We show that clustering and visualization provides a useful way to analyze and characterize network timeseries data, such as block-level outages found by active probing, and BGP path changes. Visualization and simple clustering provides new insights for both domains.
